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This paper examines the relation between competitive pressure and
ﬁnancial constraints using ﬁrm-level survey data from 27 emerg-
ing economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia for the years 2005
and 2009. In the empirical analysis, we disentangle the impact of
product market competition on the demand and supply of credit.
Our results support the hypothesis that competitive pressure on bor-
rowers affects both sides of the credit market. We ﬁnd that in
industries with greater competitive pressure ﬁrms’ demand for credit
is typically higher but a greater proportion of ﬁrms are discour-
aged from loan application due to greater cost of credit. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd the detrimental effect of competitive pressure on credit
access breaks down when ﬁrms are audited, when they can pledge
collateral and when they engage in export activities. These results
point to the role of competitive pressure in the lenders’ informa-
tion set when limited information is available.
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1. Introduction
Starting with the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) on asymmetric information, and that of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing, a large body of the ﬁnancial literature has shown that ﬁnancial
frictions can lead to credit market failures with distortions in the price mechanism. In a frictionless
economy, the ﬂow of funds would move from the least proﬁtable project to the project with the highest
net present value (NPV). In contrast, in the presence of asymmetric information, other ﬁrms’ charac-
teristics become important to determine if a project is viable and whether the ﬁrm would be able to
obtain the necessary ﬁnancing. Given the presence of information frictions, external funding is typ-
ically more expensive than internal funding, and factors like ﬁrm size, net worth and cash ﬂow become
of great importance.1 A large body of the empirical literature has investigated whether large ﬁrms are
less ﬁnancially constrained than small and medium enterprises (SMEs).2 A robust ﬁnding of this lit-
erature is that asymmetric information is especially detrimental for SMEs’ access to credit, as these
ﬁrms have generally low cash ﬂow and net worth. In addition, new enterprises’ lack of credit history
and SMEs’ insuﬃcient collateral make it diﬃcult for lenders to assess the creditworthiness of these
ﬁrms and to mitigate their default risk. This often results in restricted access to credit (Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 2011; Berger and Udell, 2006). This line of research has also shown
that the development of a country’s legal system and the depth of its ﬁnancial market are important
determinants of a ﬁrm’s access to ﬁnance.3 A survey of chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers in the U.S., Europe, and
Asia shows that asymmetric information may impose ﬁnancial frictions even on creditworthy ﬁrms,
forcing them to abandon valuable investment opportunities and to implement deep spending cuts
(Campello et al., 2011).
A separate strand of the literature focuses on the level of competition in banking as a possible de-
terminant of a ﬁrm’s ability to access external ﬁnance; on this point the evidence is mixed. Petersen
and Rajan (1994, 1995) ﬁnd that higher concentration leads to easier access to credit. Based on survey
data from 74 countries, Beck et al. (2004) ﬁnd that in more concentrated credit markets, ﬁrms of all
sizes face higher ﬁnancing obstacles and the impact of concentration decreases with ﬁrm size. Com-
bining multi-year, ﬁrm-level surveys with panel data for 53 countries, Love and Pería (2015) ﬁnd that
the link between access to ﬁnance and banking competition crucially depends on the institutional and
economic environment. Finally, Zarutskie (2006) and Rice and Strahan (2010) both exploit the U.S.
banking deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment with different results; while the former ﬁnds that
banking competition discourages creditors from lending to young ﬁrms and more generally to ﬁrms
with scarce credit history, the latter show that with more competition in the banking sector, small
ﬁrms are more likely to borrow at lower rates.
Starting from this premise, the aim of this paper is to provide an answer to one question that has
so far received little attention in the literature: whether there exists a relationship between a ﬁrm’s
ability to recruit external funds and the competitiveness of the economic environment in which it op-
erates. This research question is particularly of interest in the context of emerging economies undergoing
a process of market liberalization, through the removal of barriers to foreign and domestic competi-
tion. In an Arrow–Debreu setting with complete information, investors can perfectly predict the
proﬁtability of ﬁrms in a newly liberalized market, and the ﬁnancial system would amplify the eﬃ-
ciency gains of the liberalization process. This is because the least eﬃcient ﬁrms would have a lower
probability of survival and a more restricted access to credit. On the contrary, in the presence of in-
formation asymmetries, the allocation of credit across ﬁrmsmight not reﬂect their eﬃciency, but rather
their ability to pledge collateralizable assets. In the presence of information asymmetries, the ﬁnancial
1 The seminal work of Myers and Majluf (1984) shows how adverse selection in the credit market may generate a pecking
order in a ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choice with retained earnings favored over debt and debt over equity ﬁnancing.
2 Levine (2005) provides a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical evidence on the link between ﬁnance and
growth.
3 See e.g. Beck et al. (2005), Beck et al. (2008), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998).
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market might not necessarily facilitate the allocation of resources toward the most productive ﬁrm,
hence hampering the expected eﬃciency gains of the liberalization process.
The relationship between market structure and ﬁrms’ ﬁnance can be driven by the interplay of both
demand and supply factors. On the demand side, ﬁrms operating in a competitive industry may have
greater need for external funding to innovate and to escape Schumpeterian selection. In addition, ﬁrms
exposed to greater competition generally have lower markup and proﬁts, which may generate insuf-
ﬁcient retained earnings to internally ﬁnance current expenses and investment. On the supply side,
lenders may attach a greater risk of default to ﬁrms that are more exposed to domestic and foreign
competition. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms operating in industries with ﬁercer competition have less pledgeable
income and lower collateral.4 The hypothesis that the competitive environment is a relevant factor
for ﬁnancial intermediaries’ decisions to extend credit ﬁnds anecdotal support in the practices of the
major rating agencies. An example is provided by the following excerpt from Fitch Ratings China (2012):
“Industries that are in decline, highly competitive, capital intensive, cyclical or volatile are inherently
riskier than stable industries with few competitors, high barriers to entry, national rather than inter-
national competition and predictable demand level”. The effects of competition on lenders’ behavior
may be exacerbated in an environment where it is diﬃcult or expensive to assess individual ﬁrms’
prospects and where lenders rely more extensively on industry-level information such as openness
to new competitors or the rate of technological change.
This study examines the relation between competition and credit access on a sample of ﬁrms op-
erating in countries where incomplete protection of creditors’ rights and the recent entry of foreign
banks exacerbate information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. We contribute to the lit-
erature in a number of ways. First, we provide evidence that a ﬁrm exposed to greater competitive
pressure is more likely to report serious ﬁnancial constraints. Second, we disentangle the differential
impact of competitive pressure on a ﬁrm’s need for credit and on the probability of getting a loan.
Third, we examine the role of dissipative signals such as certiﬁcation, collateral and export status in
mitigating the effect of competitive pressure on ﬁrms’ access to credit.5 Our analysis is conducted on
survey data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), which covers
27,000 manufacturing and services ﬁrms from 27 transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central
Asia.
The countries covered by BEEPS offer the ideal environment to study the relation between com-
petition and ﬁnancial constraints because the industrial transformation and the integration of these
economies in international trade have largely occurred in the presence of less advanced ﬁnancial systems
and weaker institutions. Although foreign banks control a large proportion of the banking sector, the
extension of credit to small and medium enterprises has been generally held back by slower institu-
tional reform in the protection of creditors’ rights and in the creation of credit registries (EBRD, 2006).
As a result, during the last decade these economies have experienced substantial variations in the in-
tensity of competitive pressure, while all presented insuﬃcient access to credit, especially for SMEs.
As suggested by Carlin et al. (2004), the main advantage of studying transition economies is that their
competitive environment has been largely shaped by exogenous policies implemented during the early
stages of the liberalization process. Hence, these economies approximate the desirable features of a
large scale natural experiment, ideal to test the effects of competition on ﬁrm behavior. Since our study
refers to later stages of the transition process, the ‘natural experiment argument’ might have been
somehow weakened by the endogenous evolution of the competitive environment within indus-
tries, but it is still reasonable to assume that ﬁnancial factors did not play a major role in shaping the
competitive pressure at the industry level.
In addition, the inclusion of speciﬁc questions that allow us to distinguish between a ﬁrm’s need
and access to external ﬁnancing makes BEEPS a unique resource to study ﬁnancial constraints. These
data have previously been used to investigate the relationship between access to credit and informa-
tion sharing. For instance, Brown et al. (2009, 2011) study the role of inter-bank information sharing
4 In the presence of transaction costs and incomplete contracts, the role of collateral has been highlighted by the theoreti-
cal literature on contract theory (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
5 The dissipative signal terminology is borrowed from Tirole (2006, p. 249).
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and ﬁrm access to ﬁnance, and Popov and Udell (2012) study the sensitivity of credit supply to ﬁ-
nancial frictions arising from the institutional environment in which banks operate. Our work is closely
related to the study of Valta (2012). In that study, the author infers a causal relationship between product
market competition and cost of credit. Our paper is also tangential to the literature on how a ﬁrm’s
optimal ﬁnancial structure is affected by industry-level factors. For instance Chava and Jarrow (2004)
and Huang and Lee (2013) show that default and credit risks are affected by industries’ characteristics.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents some sug-
gestive evidence of a relationship between competitive pressure and ﬁnancial constraints. Section 3 outlines
a two-stage model to separate the role of credit demand and supply. Section 4 explores the hypothesis
that the relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and competitive pressure ismoderated by a ﬁrms’ ability
to signal its creditworthiness. Section 5 describes a series of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and preliminary analysis
The analysis is conducted on data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS), which covers the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.6 BEEPS data were
collected through face-to-face interviews with the executives of the sampled ﬁrms. BEEPS include a
rich set of information about ﬁrms’ characteristics such as origin, ownership structure, number of em-
ployees, sales in the previous ﬁscal year, age, and export status that can be used to control for ﬁrm-
level heterogeneity in cross-sectional models. The key variables of interest are based on the survey
questions concerning ﬁrms’ access to credit and the need for external ﬁnancing. The wording of these
questions change across survey waves; hence, we decide to use only the 2005 and 2009 waves of BEEPS
to increase the comparability of these information across waves.
Our dataset includes 19,136 observations from 27 countries, where the number of ﬁrms from each
country is proportional to the size of the economy.7 Table 1 breaks down the dataset by survey wave,
country, ﬁrm’s age and size. Firms with less than 20 employees constitute the largest size group ac-
counting for over the 45% of the sample. Most of the ﬁrms in the sample (i.e., 85%) are relatively young
as they have been operating for less than 20 years at the date of the interview. Hence, our sample
over-represents small and young companies that are more likely to face binding ﬁnancial constraints.
One of the variables that are both present in the 2005 and the 2009 waves of BEEPS measures the
extent to which access to external ﬁnancing is considered as an obstacle for a ﬁrm’s current opera-
tions and future growth. We rename this categorical variable Access. It takes values ranging from 1 to
4, where the lowest and the highest values respectively indicate the least and most serious ﬁnancial
constraints.8 Despite the measurement error due to the subjective evaluation of the interviewees, this
self-reported measure of ﬁnancial constraints is useful to identify ﬁrms that have diﬃcult access to
credit. BEEPS also includes a set of indicators that capture different aspects of the competitive envi-
ronment: CostDom and CostFor respectivelymeasure the importance of domestic and foreign competition
on ﬁrms’ decisions to reduce production costs. ProdDom and ProdFor gauge competitors’ inﬂuence on
ﬁrms’ efforts to develop new goods and services. These variables take four possible values ranging from
1 to 4, where 4 corresponds to the highest level of competitive pressure on the ﬁrm.9
6 This survey is a joint initiative of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and of theWorld Bank Group,
and it was implemented to assess the barriers encountered by ﬁrms. The ﬁrst wave of surveys was conducted in 1999/2000 and the
fourth and last one in 2008/2009. The survey questionnaire changed over time, and not all the variables are comparable across waves.
7 The survey sample in BEEPS is stratiﬁed by country, industry and region to enhance its representativeness across multiple
dimensions. In our sample, only the 15% of ﬁrms was interviewed in both years, hence we decided to exploit the cross-section
rather the panel dimension.
8 Table A1 in the Appendix reports the wording of the relevant questions and the coding of the possible answers.
9 Table A3 in the Appendix shows the distribution of ﬁrms with different legal status, size and age across different catego-
ries of the variables Access, CostDom, and CostFor. Over the whole sample, about 48% of ﬁrms report that access to ﬁnance is a
moderate (Access = 3) or a serious (Access = 4) obstacle to their current operations and growth. In addition, over the 60% of ﬁrms
identify domestic competition as a fairly important (CostDom = 3) or very important (CostDom = 4) factor in inducing further
reductions of the production costs. Competitive pressure on production costs appears to be relatively stronger on private, smaller,
and younger enterprises. In contrast, foreign competition appears to be a less important factor in driving down production costs
with less than 50% of ﬁrms reporting this to be a fairly important (CostFor = 3) of very important (CostDom = 4) factor.
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Our dataset is multidimensional as it includes ﬁrms from different countries, industries, and sur-
veyed in two different years. It is therefore necessary to understand which single dimension explains
most of the variations in the self-reported indicators of access to credit and competitive pressure. Table 2
reports the adjusted R2 obtained by regressing the indicators of ﬁnancial access and competition on
different sets of dummies capturing respectively country, time, industry, and country–time ﬁxed effects.10
10 Industries are deﬁned at the 3-digit level of ISIC aggregation.
Table 1
Breakdown of sample by country, survey wave, ﬁrm age and size.
Survey wave Age Size
2005 2009 Young Mid-age Mature Small Medium Large
Albania 204 54 27 215 16 143 88 27
Armenia 351 374 114 513 98 408 219 98
Azerbaijan 350 380 58 528 144 323 271 136
Belarus 325 273 59 431 108 254 200 144
Bosnia 200 261 33 364 164 240 191 130
Bulgaria 300 288 21 473 94 318 163 107
Croatia 236 104 7 248 85 182 85 73
Czech Republic 343 250 47 497 49 307 156 130
Estonia 219 273 21 426 45 233 148 111
FYROM 200 366 49 403 114 264 191 111
Georgia 200 373 59 439 75 292 197 84
Hungary 610 291 58 739 104 428 286 187
Kazakhstan 585 544 159 897 73 433 419 277
Kyrgyz 202 235 23 322 92 183 167 87
Latvia 205 271 33 408 35 222 126 128
Lithuania 205 276 34 394 53 211 150 120
Moldova 350 363 70 592 51 292 261 160
Montenegro 18 116 8 110 15 71 43 19
Poland 975 533 69 1062 377 821 369 240
Romania 600 541 63 973 105 439 387 315
Russia 601 1251 167 1371 319 531 537 537
Serbia 282 388 55 421 195 300 178 193
Slovakia 220 275 45 402 48 224 143 127
Slovenia 223 76 13 341 145 240 129 130
Tajikistan 200 360 91 356 113 248 220 92
Ukraine 594 851 150 1048 247 655 467 323
Uzbekistan 300 366 46 470 150 302 213 151
Total 9098 10,038 1579 14,443 3114 8564 6004 4237
Note: The table reports the number of ﬁrms falling within different country-age, and country-size cells.
Young, Mid-age and Mature refer to ﬁrms that were created up to 5 years, between 5 and 20 years, and
over 20 years before the survey date, respectively. Small, Medium and Large refer respectively to ﬁrms
with a number of permanent employees that is less or equal to 20, greater than 20 but smaller than
100, and greater than 100.
Table 2
Explained variance of the main variables.
Access CostDom CostFor ProdDom ProdFor
Country 0.039 0.061 0.070 0.058 0.063
Time 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000
Industry (ISIC 3-digit) 0.014 0.013 0.071 0.012 0.070
Country-time 0.076 0.071 0.083 0.067 0.074
Industry-time 0.024 0.017 0.078 0.018 0.073
Note: The table reports the adjusted R2s obtained by regressing each variable in columns on different
sets of dummy variables corresponding to the dimensions of the database reported in rows.
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The cross-country dimension explains individually the greatest share of the variance in Access (3.9%),
CostDom (6.1%), CostFor (7%), ProdDom (5.8%), and ProdFor (6.3%). Country–time ﬁxed effects have a
more explanatory power than country ﬁxed effects as the R2s of the regressions with this set of dummies
are signiﬁcantly larger. This evidence suggests that between 2005 and 2009, ﬁrms in different coun-
tries experienced a different evolution of the competitive and the ﬁnancial environment.
However, none of the dimensions reported in Table 2 individually explains more than 8.5% of the
variance of the variables of interests, conﬁrming that ﬁrm-level variations dwarf differences across
countries, time, and industries. The limited importance of the cross-country dimension suggests that
country-level policies or macroeconomic factors may have had a very different impact on access to
ﬁnance and on the competitive pressure of individual ﬁrms. Instead, the relatively small contribu-
tion of industry dummies may suggest that 3-digit ISIC industries are not disaggregated enough to
capture most of the technological aspects that affect ﬁnancial constraints (e.g., dependence from ex-
ternal ﬁnance), or the fact that these aggregations imperfectly identify groups of ﬁrms competing among
each others. The predominant ﬁrm-level component in the variation of these variables, conﬁrms that
ﬁrm-level measures of ﬁnancial constraints and competition capture more ﬁne-grained aspects than
are missed by adopting industry-level measures.11
The self-reported indicators of domestic competition CostDom and ProdDom have a strong pairwise
correlation in the sample (0.71), and the same happens for the indicators of foreign competition CostFor
and ProdFor (0.81). These strong correlations anticipate some diﬃculties in separately identifying the
effects of competitive pressure on costs and products in econometric models. Therefore, this infor-
mation is aggregated to create two indices of domestic and foreign competition that are used when
high collinearity inﬂates the variance of the estimates:
CompDom
CostDom ProdDom
=
+( ) −
−
2
8 2
CompFor
CostFor ProdFor
=
+( ) −
−
2
8 2
These indicators range from 0 and 1, where higher values are associated with ‘tougher’ competitive
environments, where ﬁrms need both to reduce costs and innovate products to survive on the market.
3. Empirical analysis
The objectives of this section are twofold; ﬁrst, we test whether ﬁrms operating in a tougher com-
petitive environment are more ﬁnancially constrained; second, we investigate whether this relationship
is driven by the demand or by the supply of credit.
3.1. Competitive pressure and perceived ﬁnancial constraints
We start our empirical analysis by investigating the relationship between self-reported measures
of ﬁnancial constraints and competitive pressure. To do so, we estimate Ordered Probit regressions
on the categorical variable Access. Each regression includes a set of ﬁrm-level variables controlling for
age, size, volume of sales, and export status. We also control for different types of ﬁrms by including
separate dummies for privatized state-owned enterprises, ﬁrms that were private since their estab-
lishment, private subsidiaries of a formerly state-owned enterprises, joint ventures with foreign partners
and for state-owned ﬁrms. All regressions include country-year and industry ﬁxed effects; these dummies
11 The tradeoff implicit in the use of ﬁrm-level variables based on survey questions is that part of their variation is due to the
noise introduced by interviewees’ subjective evaluation, or to the effect of ﬁrm-level factors affecting managers’ perception of
ﬁnancial constraints and competition. When using these indicators in regression analysis, it is therefore necessary to control
for ﬁrm-level characteristics that are associated with higher probability to report more or less intense competition and ﬁnan-
cial constraints.
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account for time invariant or slow changing country and sector characteristics, such as political regime
and quality of institutions. Naive regressions suggest that, after controlling for a standard set of ﬁrm-
level observable factors and ﬁxed-effects, the toughness of the competitive environment is positively
correlated with a ﬁrm’s probability of facing ﬁnancial constraints.
The upper panel of Fig. 1 plots the predicted probabilities associated to each level of Access (y-
axis) conditional on domestic competitive pressure (x-axis). More speciﬁcally, conditional probabilities
are obtained by plotting the marginal effects estimated by Ordered Probit on Access.12 Ceteris paribus,
the higher is the perceived level of competition, the higher is the probability that a ﬁrm reports access
to ﬁnance as a major obstacle; speciﬁcally we see that the probability to report a Major obstacle in-
creases from less than 20% to 30% when moving from the lowest to the highest level of competitive
pressure. This shift is paralleled by a reduction from 40% to less than 30% in the probability associ-
ated with the No obstacle response. Moreover, we see that the proportion of ﬁrms reporting Moderate
obstacle increases from about 20% to almost 30%; this result supports the idea that a higher propor-
tion of credit constrained ﬁrms can be found in highly competitive markets. A similar pattern emerges
in the lower panel graph, where Access is conditioned on CompFor. The comparison of the two graphs
reveals that ﬁrms’ access to credit declines faster in CompDom than in CompFor.
12 Table A4 in the Appendix shows the regression output.
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Fig. 1. Predicted probabilities of reporting different values of Access.
Notes: Conditional probabilities are estimated on the basis of the coeﬃcients reported in column (1) of Table A4 in the Ap-
pendix. Probabilities are calculated for SME, private from the start-up, with individual local ownership and that do not export
directly. Each line refers to plots the probability of reporting a particular severity of ﬁnancial constraint conditional on a par-
ticular level of competitive pressure. The ﬁnancial constraint variable is Access that evaluates the extent to which access to credit
is an obstacle for ﬁrms’ growth and current operations.
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This preliminary analysis supports the hypothesis that tougher competition is associated with more
serious ﬁnancial constraints. Moreover, the data suggest that a ﬁrm’s probability to be ﬁnancially con-
strained tends to be especially affected by the level of domestic competition. Exposure to foreign
competition is instead more important among larger ﬁrms with more internal resources that operate
in foreign markets (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2007). These companies are possibly less affected by ﬁnan-
cial constraints than small companies operating mostly on the domestic market. Although, the cross-
sectional nature of the analysis does not allow us to establish a direction of causality, these results
hint at a strong relation between competition and ﬁnancial constraints.
3.2. Demand or supply?
This section aims to disentangle the demand and supply factors that account for the positive and
signiﬁcant correlation between self-reported measures of competition and ﬁnancial constraints that
we reported in the previous section. More speciﬁcally, we test whether greater competitive pressure
increases the need for credit, or whether it worsens access to ﬁnance.
In order to identify ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, we ﬁrst establish whether a ﬁrm needs credit
from a ﬁnancial institution. Neither the 2005 nor the 2009 questionnaires include a speciﬁc question
on a ﬁrm’s credit need. However, this information can be inferred from the answers to a series of
other questions. We deﬁne those ﬁrms with a need for credit to be either those ﬁrms with a loan or
those who applied for a loan. In the 2005 questionnaire, we identify ﬁrms with a loan as those an-
swering positively to a question on whether they had to pledge collateral for their most recent loan
(question q46a), while in the 2009 questionnaire, ﬁrms were directly asked whether they had a loan
(question k8).
We then identify ﬁrms which are credit rationed. The ﬁrst group is composed by ﬁrms that applied
for a loan but that have been Rejected (question q47a in 2005 and k18a in 2009); the second set in-
cludes ﬁrms needing a loan but that did not apply because they were Discouraged. Discouraged ﬁrms
are identiﬁed as those reporting one of the following reasons for not applying for a loan: the interest
rate is too high, they do not expect to obtain a loan, the size or the maturity of the loan offered would
be insuﬃcient, they do not have suﬃcient collateral to pledge (question k17). If loan applications are
costly and if the probability of obtaining a loan at favorable conditions is low, ﬁrms may decide not
to apply for loans as a rational response to observed restrictions in the supply of credit (Jappelli, 1990).
Thus, discouraged borrowers should be considered ﬁnancially constrained.
Fig. 2 splits the sample according to our classiﬁcation. In the regression analysis this classiﬁcation
is operationalized by introducing a series of dummy variables taking value one when a ﬁrm needs
credit (Need), when a ﬁrm has a loan (Loan), when a ﬁrm unsuccessfully applied for a loan (Rejected),
and when a ﬁrm was discouraged from applying for a loan by supply side factors (Discouraged). As
suggested by Fig. 2, the dummy variables Loan, Discouraged, and Rejected can take value one only among
those ﬁrms that we classify as in need of a loan. If competitive pressure affects credit demand, the
selection into the estimation samples for the regressions on Loan, Rejected, and Discouraged is likely
to be endogenous with respect to the key independent variables. As a consequence, the non-
randomness of the sample would bias the estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest.
Consistent estimates can be obtained by implementing Heckman probit models. These models are
estimated by the maximum likelihood method, and they address sample selection by regressing si-
multaneously the ‘selection’ equation on the dichotomous variable Need, and the probit equation on
the outcome of interest (i.e., either Loan, Discouraged, or Rejected) while allowing for correlation in
the errors of the two equations. This approach allows us to identify the impact of competitive pres-
sure on a ﬁrm’s probability to have a loan, or to be ﬁnancially constrained. This empirical strategy
ﬁts our main objective of disentangling the effect of competitive pressure on the demand and on the
supply of credit.
In order to identify the different coeﬃcient of the competition variables in the two equations, we
need to select a set of variables that are excluded from the outcome equation but included in the se-
lection equation. These variables should be selected among the factors that are related to a ﬁrm’s
credit needs but not to the supply of credit. We identify four variables that are likely to satisfy the
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exclusion restriction:OverTax andOverUtil take value one if the ﬁrm has overdue tax payments or overdue
utility bills, respectively.13 It is reasonable to assume that these two variables are positively related
to negative idiosyncratic shocks to a ﬁrm cash ﬂow, which increase a ﬁrm’s demand for short-term
credit. When a ﬁrm has an overdue payment, it is more likely to require some sort of short-term ﬁ-
nancing to face the wage-bill or just to continue normal operations. Nevertheless, a ﬁrm’s overdue
payments are not expected to affect the supply of credit, since this information is not easily acquired
by ﬁnancial institutions in opaque systems.14
Two additional variables excluded from the second-stage equation of the Heckman model relate
to a ﬁrm’s resort to trade credit or trade debit. The ﬁrms surveyed in the BEEPS are asked what
percentage of their total annual sales is paid for before the delivery and also the percentage of total
annual sales paid after delivery.15. Based on these information, TradeDebit takes value zero if the ﬁrm
did not sell any item on debt in the last ﬁscal year; in our sample, about 48% of the ﬁrms report that
they were paid either on or after delivery. Similarly, TradeDebit takes value one when the ﬁrm has
provided some trade credit, here about 65% of ﬁrms report to provide customers with this form of
ﬁnance. The literature has extensively shown that trade credit/debit is an important source for
ﬁnancing, and they are particularly attractive for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, even though trade
credit is relative more expensive than short-term bank ﬁnancing (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).16
Thus, trade credit/debit is directly linked with a ﬁrm’s shortage of liquidity and a ﬁrm’s demand for
credit.
13 See Appendix for the wording of survey questions and response codes.
14 A similar instrument is also used by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013).
15 The wording of survey questions and the response codes are reported in the Appendix.
16 Estimates by Petersen and Rajan (1997) suggest that the cost of trade credit is equivalent to a 40 per cent real interest rate.
See also Atanasova (2007).
Need a loan
Yes
13325
(70%)
No
5811
(30%)
Loan
8467
(64%)
No-loan
4858 
(36%)
Discouraged
2966
(61.1%)
Rejected
845
(17.3%)
Other
1047
(21.5%)
Fig. 2. Breakdown of the sample of ﬁrms by credit status.
Notes: Each node of the ﬁgure reports the number of ﬁrms providing the answer to the survey question and the percentage of
respondents over the population of ﬁrms in the previous node. “Rejected” and “Discouraged” are highlighted as these nodes
includes all ﬁrms that we consider as “Rationed”.
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Results are presented in Table 3.17 Overall, we ﬁnd that the excluded variables are signiﬁcantly cor-
related to the demand of credit; this provides support to our hypothesis that ﬁrms which are in need
for liquidity can be identiﬁed by using overdue payments and supply credit. We proxy ﬁrm’s size by
sales, and we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on this variable is positive in the second stage equation; this is
consistent with the hypotheses that large establishments have greater need for credit and are less likely
to be either discouraged or rejected. The dummy variable Audit takes value one if the ﬁrm has been
audited by an external agency in the last twelve months. As expected, a ﬁrm that is subject to exter-
nal auditing has greater probability to secure a loan and lower probability to be discouraged. The variable
is not statistically signiﬁcant at the usual level of conﬁdence in the regression on Rejected, but this is
likely to be caused by the low number of ﬁrms reporting this outcome.
The estimates reported in columns 2 to 4 provide clear support to the hypothesis that domestic
competition negatively affects the supply of credit, as we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient of CompDom in
the regression on Loan and a positive coeﬃcient in the regression on Discouraged, both of which are
highly statistically signiﬁcant. The results on rejection are statistically insigniﬁcant. This is likely the
result of the small number of ﬁrms in this sub-sample; speciﬁcally only the 6% of ﬁrms declaring a
need for loan are then declaring to be rejected by a credit institution. On the contrary, foreign com-
petition appears related to a ﬁrm’s greater need for ﬁnancing but not with a ﬁrm’s probability of having
a loan, being discouraged or rejected. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on CompFor is positive and signiﬁcant in
ﬁrst-stage regressions on Need, but is insigniﬁcant in second-stage regressions. A possible explana-
tion is that ﬁrms engaged in international trade are more exposed to foreign competition and hence
a higher value is reported for this variable. These ﬁrms may indeed have higher need for external ﬁ-
nancing to cover the greater costs of foreign operations while having a relatively sounder ﬁnancial
situation that improve their access to credit. Alternatively, it is possible that competition in foreign
markets is also more diﬃcult to observe and therefore is less likely to be part of investors’ informa-
tion set.
4. The role of dissipative signals
Borrowing ﬁrms can mitigate information asymmetries by signaling their prospects to creditors.
The aim of this section is to test whether the negative relationship between competition and access
to credit still holds when borrowers provide signals of good performance and sound ﬁnancial struc-
ture. More speciﬁcally, we test the effectiveness of three signaling devices: certiﬁcation, export status,
and collateral.
4.1. The role of certiﬁcation
Theory suggests that a good borrower has an incentive to mitigate the investors’ informational dis-
advantage arising from informational asymmetries. One possible solution to overcome the adverse
selection is by increasing the information ﬂow between the lender and the borrower. For example,
the borrower may signal its creditworthiness by seeking external auditing generating hard informa-
tion on a company’s ﬁnances. The use of hard information as a solution to the asymmetric information
problem could be particularly relevant in transitional economies where there may be a lack of trans-
parency in company reporting and accounting standards, and lenders may be more risk averse (Brown
et al., 2011). Consistently, it has been shown at the cross-country level that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between bank information sharing and access to ﬁnance (Brown et al., 2009, 2011). On the
lenders’ side, ﬁnancial intermediaries can base their lending decisions entirely on the ﬁrms’ credit-
worthiness rather than having to rely on sectoral information.
To test this hypothesis, we introduce in the speciﬁcation of the Heckman Probit models an inter-
action between the variable of competition and the dummy Audit that takes value one if the ﬁrm had
17 Results are qualitatively similar when CompDom and CompFor are simultaneously included in the model. Given the degree
of correlation between the two forms of competition, we prefer to include these regressors separately.
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Table 3
Competition, credit demand and supply.
Loan or line of credit Discouraged Rejected
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Dependent: Loan 2nd
stage
Need 1st
stage
Loan 2nd
stage
Need 1st
stage
Discouraged
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Discouraged
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Reject 2nd
stage
Need 1st
stage
Reject 2nd
stage
Need 1st
stage
Competition
CompDom −0.146*** 0.293*** 0.158*** 0.298*** −0.109 0.301***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.05) (0.090) (0.050)
CompFor −0.054 0.203*** 0.035 0.207*** 0.036 0.209***
(0.04) (0.040) (0.05) (0.04) (0.080) (0.040)
Controls
Sales 0.182*** 0.069*** 0.183*** 0.065*** −0.206*** 0.071*** −0.206*** 0.067*** −0.047*** 0.074*** −0.047*** 0.070***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) 0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Excluded
OverUtil 0.300*** 0.263*** 0.316*** 0.278*** 0.326*** 0.290***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
OverTax 0.273*** 0.292*** 0.309*** 0.327*** 0.364*** 0.380***
(0.060) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
TradeDebit 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.110***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
TradeCredit 0.317*** 0.324*** 0.298*** 0.308*** 0.268*** 0.283***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
ρ −0.744 −0.730 0.484 0.442 −0.468 −0.439
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.023 0.042
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466
Censored 3610 3476 3610 3476 3610 3476
Note: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on ﬁrms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results are reported for
three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy = 1 if the ﬁrms need credit, but different 2nd stage dependent
variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that have a loan (columns 2–5), Disc, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged
(columns 6–9), Reject, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that apply for a loan but are rejected (columns 10–13). For each of these models, we run a speciﬁcation investigating the impact of
domestic competition (CompDom), and a speciﬁcation looking at the impact of foreign competition (CompFor). For the interest of space we report only some of the ﬁrm-level controls
included in both 1st and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include ﬁrms’ current and 3-year before size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies
for SOE, JV foreign, and domestically owned private), country-year and industry (ISIC 3-digit) speciﬁc ﬁxed effect. The set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only
in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for ﬁrms’ overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are
respectively the amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments includes also the unreported dummies denovo,
jointv, prisoe, subsoe that denote a ﬁrm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment, country-year and industry (ISIC 3-digit) ﬁxed effect. ρ is the coeﬃcient of correlation between
the ﬁrst- and the second-stage errors. S.E. are clusters at country-year level. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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its annual ﬁnancial statements checked and certiﬁed by an external auditor during the previous
ﬁscal year. Estimation results are reported in Table 4. The interaction coeﬃcient in second-stage
regressions is always negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests that for audited ﬁrms, the level of
domestic and foreign competition is irrelevant and does not determine access to credit. This evi-
dence is consistent with the idea that lenders do not have to rely on soft information, such as the
level of competition, when hard information, such as auditing, is available. The estimated coeﬃcients
of the controls and the exclusion restrictions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
estimated in Table 3.
4.2. International ﬁrms and ﬁnancial constraints
In this section, we exploit a ﬁrm’s export status to test whether the negative correlation between
competitive pressure and access to credit is related to lenders’ concerns about the sustainability of
the borrower’s debt in a tough domestic environment. A recent trade literature focusing on ﬁrms’ het-
erogeneity has stressed how export status provides a strong signal about companies’ current and future
ability to survive in the domestic market, since only more capable ﬁrms select into exporting (e.g.,
Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Hence, our hypothesis is that a ﬁrm’s export status miti-
gates the detrimental effect of competitive pressure on access to credit only if this relation is explained
by the higher probability of default for ﬁrms operating in competitive industries. We utilize export
status as a signal of a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness to better characterize the nexus between competition
and ﬁnancial constraints.
The starting point for this analysis is the Heckman selection model described in Section 3.2. Two
modiﬁcations are now introduced on the right-hand side of the model to account for ﬁrm’s export
position. First, we include a dummy to capture a ﬁrm’s export status (exp3); this takes value of 1 for
those ﬁrms that exported part of their output directly three years before the survey date, and value 0
otherwise.18 The major advantage of using a lagged variable for export is that it is less likely to be
simultaneously determined by the probability to be discouraged (or rejected) in regressions. Indeed,
our dependent variables, Loan, Discouraged, and Rejected refer to credit events occurred in the ﬁscal
year before the survey date, while exp3 refers to the export status of the ﬁrm three years before the
survey date. Second, the variables capturing domestic and foreign competitive pressure (CompDom
and CompFor, respectively) are included in the model interacted with exp3 and with NOexp exp3 1 3= − .
Hence, the coeﬃcients of the terms CompDom exp× 3 and CompFor exp× 3 capture the correlation
between competition and credit rationing for those ﬁrms that exported three years before the survey
date. On the contrary, the coeﬃcients on CompDom NOexp× 3 and CompFor NOexp× 3 capture the same
correlation for non-exporters. By allowing the coeﬃcients of CompDom and CompFor to differ between
exporters and non-exporters, this design provides a test of whether export status improves credit access
by providing a signal to ﬁnancial intermediaries about ﬁrms’ greater capacity to withstand compet-
itive pressure.
The results from the two-step Heckman model are reported in Table 5. Second-stage regressions
on Loan, Discouraged, and Rejected provide strong evidence that the positive relationship between com-
petition, both domestic and foreign, and ﬁnancial constraints holds for non-exporters but it does not
hold for exporters. Therefore, export status is an effective strategy for ﬁrms that operate in compet-
itive environments improving their access to ﬁnancing.
4.3. The collateral channel
Extensive work has been conducted on the role of collateral as a key determinant of ﬁrms’ bor-
rowing capacity. For instance, Chan and Thakor (1987) show how borrowers who pledge collateral
18 Out of 19,123 respondents, about 22% of ﬁrms report a value different from zero.
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Table 4
Competition, credit demand and supply. Revealing information through auditing.
Loan or line of credit Discouraged
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Loan 2nd stage Need 1st stage Loan 2nd stage Need 1st stage Discouraged 2nd stage Need 1st stage Discouraged 2nd stage Need 1st stage
Competition
CompDom −0.251*** 0.296*** 0.239*** 0.298***
(0.070) (0.050) (0.070) (0.050)
CompDom × Audit 0.243*** −0.205*
(0.090) (0.110)
CompFor −0.138** 0.203*** 0.100 0.206***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.060) (0.040)
CompFor × Audit 0.165* −0.129
(0.09) (0.090)
Controls
Sales 0.173*** 0.068*** 0.174*** 0.064*** −0.198*** 0.071*** −0.198*** 0.067***
(0.030) (0.010) (0.02) (0.01) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Audit 0.004 0.022 0.091* 0.009 −0.051 0.014 −0.135* 0.007
(0.070) (0.030) (0.05) (0.03) (0.080) (0.030) (0.060) (0.030)
Excluded
OverUtil 0.297*** 0.259*** 0.313*** 0.275***
(0.090) (0.09) (0.100) (0.10)
OverTax 0.269*** 0.288*** 0.307*** 0.325***
(0.060) (0.07) (0.060) (0.070)
TradeDebit 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.020) (0.02) (0.020) (0.030)
TradeCredit 0.315*** 0.324*** 0.298*** 0.308***
(0.030) (0.03) (0.030) (0.030)
ρ −0.765 −0.757 0.490 0.449
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.015
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466
Censored 3610 3476 3610 3476
Note: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on ﬁrms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results are reported for
three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy = 1 if the ﬁrms need credit, but different 2nd stage dependent
variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that have a loan (columns 1–4), Disc, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged
(columns 5–8), Reject, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that apply for a loan but are rejected (columns 9–12). Audit takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has been audited during the last year. For
the interest of space, we report only some of the ﬁrm-level controls included in both 1st and 2nd stage equations. Unreported controls include ﬁrms’ current and 3-year before size
(dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign, domestically owned private). The set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are in-
cluded only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for ﬁrms’ overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit
that are respectively the amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to consumers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies
denovo, jointv, prisoe, subsoe that denote a ﬁrm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment, country-year and industry (ISIC 3-digit) ﬁxed effect. ρ is the coeﬃcient of correlation
between the ﬁrst- and the second-stage errors. S.E. are clusters at country-year level. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table 5
Exporters vs non non-exporters.
Loan or line of credit Discouraged Rejected
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Competition
CompDom × exp3 −0.038 0.259*** −0.016 0.260*** −0.249** 0.226***
(0.100) (0.090) (0.120) (0.090) (0.120) (0.090)
CompDom × NOexp3 −0.171*** 0.319*** 0.195*** 0.325*** −0.061 0.350***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.110) (0.050)
CompFor × exp3 0.042 0.115 −0.056 0.111 −0.007 0.118
(0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.080) (0.13) (0.080)
CompFor × NOexp3 −0.118*** 0.200*** 0.092 0.205** 0.022 0.239***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.050) (0.07) (0.050)
exp3 0.032 0.211*** 0.053 0.170*** 0.028 0.215*** −0.056 0.176*** 0.149 0.273*** 0.070 0.197***
(0.090) (0.070) (0.080) (0.060) (0.110) (0.070) (0.090) (0.060) (0.100) (0.070) (0.080) (0.060)
Controls
Sales 0.170*** 0.063*** 0.172*** 0.060*** −0.195*** 0.065*** −0.195*** 0.063*** −0.052*** 0.069*** −0.053*** 0.067
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Audit 0.154*** 0.015 0.149*** 0.010 −0.179*** 0.015 −0.181*** 0.009 0.068 0.010 0.068 0.003
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.030)
Excluded
Overutil 0.301*** 0.262*** 0.318*** 0.278*** 0.336*** 0.300***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Overtax 0.269*** 0.287*** 0.307*** 0.325*** 0.376*** 0.392***
(0.060) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Tradedebit 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 0.095***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Tradecredit 0.310*** 0.322*** 0.293 0.306*** 0.282*** 0.297***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 12,844 12,466 12,844 12,466 12,909 12,532
Censored 3610 3476 3610 3476 3628 3494
ρ −0.760 −0.751 0.485 0.447 −0.407 −0.339
ρ (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.059 0.069
Note: The table reports estimates from maximum likelihood Heckman Probit models on ﬁrms demand for credit (1st stages) and credit supply (2nd stages). Results are reported for
three different models with the same 1st stage dependent variable expressing demand for credit (Need), that is a dummy = 1 if the ﬁrms need credit, but different 2nd stage dependent
variables for credit supply: Loan, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that have a loan (columns 2–5), Disc, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that do not apply for a loan because discouraged
(columns 6–9), Reject, that is a dummy = 1 for ﬁrms that apply for a loan but are rejected (columns 10–13). exp3 assumes the value of 1 for those ﬁrms that exported part of their output
directly three years before the survey date. NOexp3 is equal to 1 − exp3. For the interest of space, we report only some of the ﬁrm-level controls included in both 1sth and 2nd stage
equations. Unreported controls include ﬁrms’ current and 3-year before size (dummies for medium and large companies), age, legal status (dummies for SOE, JV foreign, domestically
owned private). The set of regressors under the heading ‘Excluded’ are included only in the 1st stage demand equations. This includes: OverUtil and OverTax that are dummies for ﬁrms’
overdue payments for utility bills and taxation, TradeDebit and TradeCredit that are respectively the amount of credit received by the company from suppliers and extended to consum-
ers. The set of excluded instruments include also the unreported dummies denovo, jointv, prisoe, subsoe that denote a ﬁrm’s legal origin at the moment of its establishment, country-
year and industry (ISIC 3-digit) ﬁxed effect. ρ is the coeﬃcient of correlation between the ﬁrst- and the second-stage errors. S.E. are clusters at country-year level. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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are less subject tomoral hazard; by sharing part of the risk, borrowers are prevented from increasing their
expected return against lenders’ interests. In addition, when lenders cannot identify ex-ante the risk em-
bodied in borrowers’ projects, collateral can be used as a device throughwhich safer borrowers signal their
nature to ﬁnancial intermediaries (Manove et al., 2001). Starting from this premise, this section investi-
gateswhether a collateral channel exists, throughwhich competitive pressure translates intomore diﬃcult
access to credit. In otherwords, we testwhether ﬁrms inmore competitive industries are required to pledge
more collateral to access affordable credit. Indeed, a collateral channel may explain the positive relation-
ship between competitive pressure and discouragement from loan application.
We ﬁrst describe the reasons for discouragement from loan application, as reported by ﬁrms’ rep-
resentatives when answering question k17.19 Table 5 shows the number of ﬁrms reporting each of the
possible reasons to be discouraged as a proportion of the respondents. The three main causes of dis-
couragement are high interest rates (34.1%), complexity of application procedures (29%), and high
collateral requirements (19.1%). While there is not any theoretical foundation to expect that domes-
tic competitive pressure induces banks to adopt more complex procedures for loan applications, the
link between competitive pressure, high interest rates, and collateral requirement can be rational-
ized with the argument that ﬁrms in highly competitive industries are riskier borrowers because they
face greater probability of failure and greater uncertainty over future return. The positive relation between
cost of credit and competition is supported by the results previously reported in Section 3.2, whereas
the relation between collateral requirement and competitive pressure remains to be tested (Table 6).
The variable Collateral (i.e., collateral requirement as a proportion of the loan value, question k15)
is regressed on CompDom and CompFor and on the set of ﬁrm-level controls previously used in the
augmented model on Access.20 However, since the values of Collateral are observed only for those ﬁrms
that obtain credit, it is still necessary to correct for selection bias. As for before the ﬁrst stage of the
regression takes into consideration whether a ﬁrm needs external ﬁnancing. The ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion on Need maintains the same speciﬁcation as previously used in section 3.2.
First, the model is estimated on the whole sample; Table 7 reports the ﬁrst set of results.21 When
the model is estimated on the whole sample, ﬁrms exposed to the most intense level of domestic com-
petition, CompDom, are found pledging collateral that covers on average 11.4% more of the loan value
than ﬁrms exposed to the lowest level of domestic competition. In line with the previous evidence,
we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s size and auditing enter positively in the ﬁrst stage of the regression.
We then explore the role of the collateral by taking advantage both of the cross-ﬁrm and the cross-
country dimensions of our dataset.22 Table 8 reports estimates obtained by running the regressions
on different samples. Because strong legal right enforcement is a prerequisite for a creditor’s ability
19 Answers to this question have been provided in both survey waves.
20 As reported in column 1 of Table A4. See Appendix for the BEEPS question on collateral.
21 The results show a large coeﬃcient since the dependent variable is the value of the collateral required as a percentage of
the value of the loan or line of credit.
22 The analysis in this section ignores the role of foreign competition, given that it was found to be statistically insigniﬁcant
in the previous sections.
Table 6
Reasons for being Discouraged.
Freq. Percent
Application procedures are to complex 1086 29.11
Interest rates are not favorable 1275 34.17
Collateral requirements are too high 714 19.14
Size of loan or maturity are insuﬃcient 113 3.03
It is necessary to make informal payment 54 1.45
Did not think it would be approved 162 4.34
Other 325 8.71
No response 2 0.05
Total 3731 100
Note: This table refers to question k17 in the BEEPS panel dataset.
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to seize the collateral in case of a ﬁrm’s default, we ﬁrst run separate regressions for ﬁrms operating
in countries with relatively stronger or weaker legal rights enforcement. Legal right enforcement is
measured using the Strength of legal rights index (0–10) from the World Bank Doing Business Data-
base. We classify countries with a value of the index above the sample median of 6 as those having a
relatively higher score. We then estimate separate regressions for ﬁrms operating in countries adher-
ing to the European Union. Lastly, we estimate separate models on the samples of smaller and larger
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that domestic competition is associated with higher collateral requirements in coun-
tries with stronger legal right enforcement (Legalrightsindex > 6). This result is consistent with the
argument made in the literature according to which the use of collateral is common only in those coun-
tries where creditors’ rights are suﬃciently protected to ensure that collateralized assets can be eventually
seized by lenders (EBRD, 2006). Similar results are instead obtained for countries within or outside
the EU. On the contrary, ﬁrm size is found to mediate the relationship between competition and col-
lateral requirements, as we ﬁnd that competitive pressure is associated with greater collateral
requirements only among small companies.
The positive correlation between CompDom and Collateral supports the hypothesis that ﬁnancial
constraints are more severe when competition is intense. On one hand, ﬁnancial institutions may require
more collateral to accept loan applications from ﬁrms that operate in more competitive industries.
On the other hand, even if investors do not impose minimum levels, entrepreneurs may still need to
pledge relatively more collateral to obtain affordable credit. This process conﬁgures a vicious cycle
for small ﬁrms; they are more dependent on debt ﬁnancing for growth but at the same time they are
also more vulnerable to competitive pressure than larger incumbents.23 As a consequence, when banks
23 This evidence is consistent with the model of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) where ﬁnancial frictions higher mortality of young
and small ﬁrms.
Table 7
Collateral channel.
Domestic Foreign
Collateral 2nd stage Need 1st stage Collateral 2nd stage Need 1st stage
Competition
CompDom 11.431*** 0.129***
(3.620) (0.040)
CompFor 4.302 0.105***
(3.300) (0.040)
Controls
Sales −1.279 0.183*** −1.415 0.282***
−(1.420) (0.010) (1.440) −0.02
Audit −1.899 0.136*** −2.059 0.120***
(2.55) (0.030) (2.58) −0.03
Excluded
Overutil 0.216*** 0.194***
(−0.070) −0.070
Overtax 0.135*** 0.147**
(−0.070) −0.070
Tradedebit 0.137*** 0.131***
(0.030) (0.030)
Tradecredit 0.329*** 0.331***
(0.030) (0.030)
λ −14.012 −14.348
S.E. 9.202 9.508
Obs. 12,267 11,910
Censored 6698 6452
Note: The table reports estimates from two-step Heckmanmodels on ﬁrms demand for credit (1st stages)
and collateral value as % of the loan amount (2nd stages). The table reports separately estimates from
models investigating the impact of domestic and foreign competition. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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Table 8
Collateral channel heterogeneity.
Legal > 6 Legal < 6 EU = 0 EU = 1 Size = 1 Size = 3
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Collateral
2nd stage
Need 1st
stage
Competition
CompDom 17.153*** 0.096* 3.662 0.228*** 9.967** 0.167*** 13.416** 0.061 11.978* 0.001 8.423 0.187**
(4.790) (0.050) (6.420) (0.070) (4.930) (0.050) (5.320) (0.070) (6.400) (0.060) (6.18) (0.087)
Controls
Sales −2.000 0.162*** 0.280 0.224*** −0.671 0.188*** −3.148 0.178*** 4.993* 0.189 −2.073 0.154
(1.800) (0.01) (2.59) (0.02) (1.890) (0.010) (2.110) (0.02) (2.840) (0.020) (2.08) (0.02)
Audit 2.237 0.123*** −8.059* 0.085* 0.188*** 0.113*** −0.040 0.164*** −2.673 0.141*** −4.273 0.270***
(3.420) (0.04) (4.28) (0.050) (0.01) (0.040) (3.940) (0.050) (4.740) (0.040) (5.44) (0.070)
Excluded
Overutil 0.132 0.417*** 0.103 0.359*** 0.209* 0.107
(0.090) (0.130) (0.090) (0.110) (0.110) (0.140)
Overtax 0.102 0.212* 0.241*** −0.003 0.013 0.166
(0.080) (0.120) (0.090) (0.100) (0.100) (0.130)
Tradedebit 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.111*** 0.187*** 0.063 0.210***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060)
Tradecredit 0.350*** 0.258*** 0.336*** 0.315*** 0.369*** 0.272***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.070)
λ −19.470 −8.872 −12.299 −28.416 12.372 −3.487
S.E. 12.478 14.304 11.734 13.849 15.956 19.356
Obs. 6674 4136 7200 5067 5718 2682
Censored 3671 2158 4126 2572 3791 994
Note: This table reports estimates from two-step Heckman selection models on ﬁrms demand for credit (1st stages) and collateral value as % of the loan amount (2nd stages). The table
reports estimates obtained on separate sub-samples of the dataset. Legal > 6 and Legal < 6 are respectively samples of ﬁrms from countries below or above the median value of the World
Bank Doing Business index of legal protection of property rights. EU = 1 and EU = 0 are respectively samples of ﬁrms from countries that are members and non-members of the Euro-
pean Union. Size = 1 and Size = 3 are samples including small and large ﬁrms only. For a description of the model speciﬁcation refer to the notes of Table 3.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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sign debt contracts with small ﬁrms whose survival is threatened by competitors, they require higher
interest rates or more collateral to insure themselves against borrowers’ greater risk of default.
5. Robustness checks
All analyses have been conducted on a dataset that pools together observations for the years 2005
and 2009. To control for year-speciﬁc effects, we included a dummy variable taking value 1 in 2009
as a control. Arguably this strategy is insuﬃcient to capture structural shifts in the parameters across
the two periods. For instance, it is possible that a deterioration in credit supply during 2009 gener-
ates very different parameters from those describing credit relationships in 2005. It is therefore necessary
to validate our results by repeating the analysis on individual year sub-samples. We estimate the two-
stage model on data from years 2005 and 2009 separately; Table 9 reports the results.24 In the two
individual years, the relationship between the intensity of productmarket competition and credit demand
and supply is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained on the pooled sample and re-
ported in Table 3.
Because previous research highlights the role of banking competition on access to credit (e.g.,
Beck et al., 2004), it is possible that the results may be affected by variations in credit market
competition. To account for this factor, we include further country-time speciﬁc controls on the
right-hand side of the model. First, we introduce the Boone Index and the Banking Concentration
Ratio as standard measures of competition in the banking sector.25 In addition, because banking
competition in the countries that we study is largely due to the penetration of foreign ﬁnancial
intermediaries, we conduct robustness checks controlling for the percentage of foreign bank assets
over total bank assets. For completeness we also run a speciﬁcation with the introduction of the GDP
growth. Table 10 reports the estimated parameter on CompDom and CompFor when these controls
are included in regressions.
Our main message still holds and does not appear to be inﬂuenced by the structure of the banking
system. The degree of product market competition positively affects a ﬁrm’s demand for credit while
increasing the probability encountering ﬁnancial constraints.26
24 Full set of results not reported here to preserve space, but available upon request.
25 These indicators are obtained from the Global Financial Development Database. The Boone index measures the degree of
competition in the banking market based on proﬁt eﬃciency. It is calculated as the elasticity of proﬁts to marginal costs. An
increase in the Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the competitive conduct of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Bank concen-
tration is instead measured as the assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Total
assets include total earning assets, cash and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, ﬁxed assets, goodwill, other intangibles,
current tax assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets.
26 The coeﬃcient on foreign bank assets is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% on the ﬁrst set of results. Even if the coeﬃcient
has the expected sign, i.e. more foreign competition increases the probability of ﬁrms being able to access ﬁnance; the mag-
nitude of the coeﬃcient deters us from drawing strong economic conclusions.
Table 9
Estimates for 2005 and 2009.
Loan Discouraged Collateral
2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009
CompDom 2nd stage −0.143* −0.148** 0.169* 0.140* 5.990 15.594***
1st stage 0.396*** 0.275*** 0.311*** 0.279 0.132** 0.124**
CompFor 2nd stage −.026 −0.093* 0.022 0.050 −1.901 10.338**
1st stage 0.263*** 0.133*** 0.268*** 0.138*** 0.165 0.038
Note: Refer to Table 3 for speciﬁcations in columns 2 to 4 and Table 7 for columns 5–6. Signiﬁcance levels:
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the hypothesis that in relatively underdeveloped ﬁnancial systems, the com-
petitive environment plays an important role in lenders’ information set when deciding upon ﬁrms’
cost and access to ﬁnancing. More speciﬁcally, we investigate whether greater need for ﬁnancing and
tighter access to ﬁnance concur to worsen the ﬁnancial constraints experienced by ﬁrms operating
in tough markets.
Evidence from transition economies, where ﬁnancial frictions are exacerbated by relatively un-
derdeveloped legal systems, suggests that ﬁnancial constraints are more serious in the presence of
ﬁercer competitive pressure. By disentangling the impact of competition on the demand and supply
of credit, we support the hypothesis that competitive pressure on borrowers affects both sides of the
credit market; demand for credit is higher in competitive industries but a greater proportion of ﬁrms
are discouraged from loan application because of high collateral requirements and high cost of
credit. This result can be explained by the fact that ﬁrms under greater competitive pressure are
perceived as riskier borrowers. Indeed, the relation between competition and ﬁnancial constraints is
relaxed for ﬁrms that have their ﬁnancial statements audited and for exporters whose international
activity is a strong signal of their survival prospects on the domestic market (Bridges and Guariglia,
2008). Moreover, the results in this paper emphasize that the collateral channel plays a prominent
role in the link between competitive pressure faced by the ﬁrms and discouragement from loans
application.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that policy measures aimed to address ﬁrms’ ﬁnan-
cial constraints should be particularly targeted to those industries with greater competitive pressure,
and that export promotion policies may have desirable indirect effects on ﬁrms’ access to ﬁnancing.
Lastly, from the point of view of transition economies, liberalization policies that deepen domestic
and foreign competition should be accompanied or preceded by interventions to reduce the cost of
credit and to increase credit supply for small and medium enterprises.
Table 10
Robustness checks: controlling for credit market structure and economic growth across countries.
Country-year control Competition Need Loan Discouraged
Boone Index
CompDom 0.246*** −0.154*** 0.178***
CompFor 0.208*** 0.045 −0.042
Banking concentration ratio
CompDom 0.246*** −0.147*** 0.168***
CompFor 0.208*** 0.038 −0.034
Foreign bank assets
CompDom 0.236*** −0.167*** 0.202***
CompFor 0.205*** 0.024 −0.005
GDP growth
CompDom 0.264*** −0.194*** 0.222***
CompFor 0.201*** −0.029 0.269***
Note: Refer to Table 3 for full speciﬁcations. Boone is measure of degree of banking competition calcu-
lated by the World Bank. It is computed as the elasticity of proﬁts to marginal costs. An increase in the
Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the competitive conduct of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Concen-
tration is measure of degree of competition in the banking sector calculated by the World Bank. Assets
of ﬁve largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Total assets include total earning
assets, cash and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, ﬁxed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current
tax assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets. ForeignBankAssets is deﬁned as the
percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an economy. A
foreign bank is a bank where 50% or more of its shares are owned by foreigners. The variable is from
theWorld Bank’s Global Financial Development database. GDP is the growth rate of GDP for each country
in our sample. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Appendix
Table A1
Values assumed by the categorical variables.
Variable Wording of survey questions and answers’ codes
Financial constraints
Access QUESTION: Can you tell me how problematic is access to ﬁnancing (e.g., collateral required) or ﬁnancing not
available from banks for the operations and growth of your business?
ANSWERS: 1-No obstacle, 2-Minor obstacle, 3-Moderate obstacle, 4-Major obstacle.
ANSWERS: 1-No obstacle, 2-Minor obstacle, 3-Moderate obstacle, 4-Major obstacle.
Competition
CostDom QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from domestic competitors on key decisions
with respect to reducing the production costs of existing products or services?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
CostFor QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from foreign competitors on key decisions
with respect to reducing the production costs of existing products or services?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
ProdDom QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from domestic competitors on key decisions
with respect to developing new products services and markets?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
ProdFor QUESTION: How would you rate the importance of the pressure from foreign competitors on key decisions
with respect to developing new products services and markets?
ANSWERS: 1-Not important, 2-Slightly important, 3-Fairly important, 4-Very important.
Exclusion restrictions
Overutil Does this establishment currently have any payments overdue by more than 90 days with each of the
following:
ANSWERS: 1-Yes, 2-No.
Overtax Does this establishment currently have any payments overdue by more than 90 days with each of the
following:
ANSWERS: 1-Yes, 2-No.
TradeDebit In ﬁscal year […], what percent of this establishment’s total annual sales of its goods or services were:
ANSWERS: Paid for before the delivery?
TradeCredit In ﬁscal year […], what percent of this establishment’s total annual sales of its goods or services were:
ANSWERS: Paid for after the delivery?
Collateral
Collateral Referring only to this most recent line of credit or loan, what was the approximate value of the collateral
required as a percentage of the value of the loan or line of credit?
ANSWER: Value of collateral as percent of loan/line of credit value.
Exporters
exp What percentage of establishment’s sales were:
ANSWER: direct exports
Table A2
Questions for Need, Loan, Discouraged and Rejected.
BEEPS 2005
q46a “Thinking of the most recent loan you obtained from a ﬁnancial institution, did the ﬁnancing
require collateral?”
q47a “If your ﬁrm does not currently have a loan, what was the reason?”
q47b “If your ﬁrm did not apply for a loan, what were the main reasons?”
BEEPS 2009
k8 “Does this establishment have a line of credit or a loan from a ﬁnancial institutions?”
k17 “Which is the main reason for not applying for a loan or a line of credit?”
k18a “In ﬁscal year 2007, did this establishment apply for any new loans or new lines of credit
that were rejected?”
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